Jasmyn L. Jackson
Associate / Atlanta
Jasmyn Jackson is an associate in the Atlanta office of Copeland Stair, who primarily practices Healthcare Litigation. Jasmyn represents and advises physicians, healthcare practices and facilities, and other medical and wellness professionals through a wide variety of legal, regulatory, and professional matters. Through research and analysis, Jasmyn remains current in the highly regulated and rapidly changing healthcare industry. Prior to joining CSKL, Jasmyn worked at another Atlanta-area civil litigation firm after serving as Assistant Attorney General in the Georgia Office of the Attorney General. As Assistant Attorney General, Jasmyn provided legal support and advice to all Professional Licensing Boards governed by the Secretary of State, giving her a unique and valuable perspective in her current practice.
Jasmyn earned her B.A. in Political Science from the University of Georgia and her J.D. from Georgia State University College of Law. Jasmyn is a native Atlantan, married to her husband, Anthony Jackson. They welcomed their first baby, Turner Jackson, into the family on October 17, 2020. Jasmyn is a proud supporter of HouseProud, a local Atlanta-based organization that provides home repair and modifications for the most at-risk members of the Atlanta community.
Publications and Presentations
Georgia Court of Appeals Reverses Summary Judgment on Causation in Case Against Nurse – Health Law and Regulation Update Blog Post by Jasmyn Jackson
July 7, 2021
Health Law and Regulation Update Blog Post by Jasmyn Jackson. The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment to a nurse on causation after the treating doctor testified they would not have done anything different. Plaintiff alleged the patient died of a pulmonary embolus following knee surgery. Plaintiff contended a nurse violated the standard of care by failing to appreciate the decedent’s risk of DVT, failing to report the decedent’s immobility to a physician, and failing to institute a DVT prophylaxis protocol. The treating physician testified that even if he had been called, he would not have changed his course of treatment. Plaintiff identified three expert witnesses, including a doctor and nurse on standard of care and one physician to testify on causation. The causation expert testified that it was incumbent on the nurses to relay the decedent’s condition to the treating physician and had the nurses done so, the treating physician’s treatment would have been different and the decedent’s risk of DVT could have been reduced. Defendant moved for summary judgment, alleging that Plaintiff failed to prove the outcome would have been different because the treating physician testified he would not have done anything differently. The trial court granted the motion. The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the testimony of Plaintiff’s causation expert was sufficient to send the case to a jury. In this case, the treating physician’s testimony was not enough to show conclusively that Plaintiff could not get to a jury on causation because Plaintiff’s expert opined that if the nurse provided more information to the treating physician, the treating physician would have chosen a different method of treatment. In prior decisions, the Court of Appeals has held that a treating physician’s testimony that they would not have done anything different is sufficient to uphold summary judgment. The Court of Appeals distinguished this line of cases by holding the testimony of an expert witness on causation should be considered in whether the treating physician’s actions may have been the proximate cause of the injury, despite the treating physician’s own testimony. Take-home: As a technical legal matter, an opinion dispute between the expert and the treating physician can create an issue for the jury. Orr v. SSC Atlanta Operating Company, 2021 WL 2702126 (July 1, 2021) For similar articles, or to subscribe to CSKL's Health Law and Regulation Update Blog, please click here.
Court of Appeals Affirms Trial Court’s Denial to Add Treating P.A. and Reverses Summary Judgment – Health Law and Regulation Update Blog Post by Jasmyn Jackson
July 1, 2021
Health Law and Regulation Update Blog Post by Jasmyn Jackson. The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny Plaintiff’s motion to add the treating physician assistant as a Defendant. The Court further reversed the trial court’s grant of Defendant’s Motion for summary judgment based on standard of care and causation. Plaintiff presented to the first hospital on October 11, 2014 with complaints of acute lower right leg pain. She reported the pain as a nine out of ten. After evaluation, the physician assistant prescribed pain medication and discharged Plaintiff. Defendant was not present during the physician assistant’s treatment, but later reviewed and signed the Plaintiff’s chart. On October 14, 2014, Plaintiff presented to a second hospital with swelling and discoloration in her right foot and worsening foot pain. After diagnosis, she underwent an open tibial thrombectomy that day. Ten days after the thrombectomy, Plaintiff again presented to the first hospital with a “cool to the touch,” discolored right foot. Plaintiff's foot was ultimately partially amputated in December 2014. Plaintiff filed her lawsuit in June of 2016 alleging a failure to diagnose a serious arterial dysfunction. Plaintiff introduced experts who opined this failure to diagnose was a violation of the standard of care. On October 7, 2016, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint naming the physician assistant as a Defendant. Plaintiff did not file a motion to add a defendant and she did not move for leave to add a defendant. Additionally, Plaintiff failed to serve the physician assistant before the statute of limitations ended on October 11, 2016. The physician assistant entered a Special Appearance and filed a Motion to Dismiss. The Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion to add Defendant and granted the physician assistant’s motion to dismiss. The Court held the physician assistant did not receive notice of the action prior to the statute of limitations and the physician assistant did not know and had no way of knowing that she would be a defendant in the case. The Defendant then moved for summary judgment arguing Plaintiff failed to produce evidence that Defendant violated the standard of care or that Defendant’s alleged negligence was the cause of Plaintiff’s damages. The Court held the trial Court erred in granting Defendant’s summary judgment on standard of care because there was still a question as to whether Plaintiff was in fact stable and able to receive treatment as a nonemergency patient. The Court further held, based on the conflicting affidavits and testimony, a fact dispute remained as to whether a delay in treatment caused a misdiagnosis. Take-home: At the very least, a potential defendant must know of the lawsuit prior to the statute of limitations running. However, it is imperative to always motion the court to add a Defendant and motion the court for leave to add that Defendant, when necessary. With respect to standard of care, whether a patient was non-emergent is based on the condition of the patient. It is the condition of the patient that controls, not the opinion of the physician. Seemingly, the condition of the patient is almost always a jury question. Lastly, on causation, a jury question will remain if there are conflicting affidavits and testimonies as to whether the process and methods of treatment were the cause of the underlying harm. Connie v. Garnett, 2021 WL 2548834.
Georgia Court of Appeals Affirms Each New Arbitration Provision a Patient Signs Constitutes A New Agreement – Health Law and Regulation Update Blog Post by Jasmyn Jackson
June 3, 2021
Health Law and Regulation Update Blog Post by Jasmyn Jackson. The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration where Plaintiff previously signed an arbitration provision, but denied signing a subsequent, albeit identical, provision to arbitrate. Plaintiff visited the hospital several times for unrelated procedures and was presented with the arbitration provision on each visit. On the March 2018 and April 2018 visits, Plaintiff did not sign under the provision. On the May 21, 2018 visit Plaintiff did sign the provision. On the June 4, 2018 and August 2018 visits, Plaintiff did not sign the provision. The August 2018 visit is the visit at issue. Plaintiff alleged he suffered injuries due to Defendants professional negligence during the August 2018 surgical procedure. Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration based on an arbitration provision in a consent Plaintiff signed during an earlier visit to the same hospital for treatment unrelated to the visit at issue in this lawsuit. The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion stating “re-presenting an arbitration agreement to a previously admitted patient constitutes an abandonment of any prior arbitration agreement signed by that patient.” On appeal, Defendants argued Plaintiffs signature on the arbitration provision dated May 21, 2018 applied to all future admission. The Court disagreed, holding that Georgia law require us to give meaning to every term of a contract. The Defendant’s representation of the arbitration agreement at each visit constitutes an intent to offer the readmitted patient a new opportunity to accept or reject the arbitration. The Court held the each presentation of the arbitration agreement was an abandonment of the previous agreement and a new offer to either accept or reject arbitration. Take-home: The most recent arbitration provision that a patient signed is the controlling agreement, regardless of previous visits at the same hospital and regardless of patient’s prior rejections or acceptions. Emory Healthcare, Inc. v. Farrell, S.E. 2d, 2021 WL 2217060 (2021). For similar articles or to subscribe to our Health Law and Regulation Update Blog, please click here.